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ADMINISTRATION 8,
UNION 0
MICHAEL

A.

FOLEY*

The NLRB v. Yeshiva University' decision, in which the Supreme
Court ruled that faculty at Yeshiva University were managerial employees and, hence, not subject to the protections of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act" or "NLRA"), 2 is now more than four years old. Since the
decision, numerous labor relations cases involving faculty have been decided by using Yeshiva as precedent. The greatest fear concerning
Yeshiva-that it sounded the death knell for faculty unionization in
higher education-has virtually come to pass. Only in the most unusual of
circumstances are faculty able to organize with the support of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"). 3 In those cases in* Professor of Philosophy, Marywood College, Scranton, Pennsylvania; B.A., Eastern Illinois University; M.A., Southern Illinois University; Ph. D., Southern Illinois University;
M.P.A., New York University.
444 U.S. 672 (1980).
See 29-U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a) (1982). Although there is no express exclusion in
the Act for managerial employees, "the [National Labor Relations] Board's early decisions,
the purpose and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Board's subsequent
and consistent construction of the Act for more than two decades, and the decisions of the
courts of appeals all point unmistakably to [such a] conclusion." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974). It is clear that rank-and-file workers are not conferred with
managerial status. See General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974). Rather, such
status "is reserved for those in executive-type positions, those who are closely aligned with
management as true representatives of management." Id. It should be noted that in the
Board's view, "managerial authority is not vested in professional employees merely by virtue
of their professional status." Id. Thus, professional employees are included within the jurisdiction of the Act.
Among the categories of workers excluded from the provisions of the Act are agricultural workers, domestic servants, independent contractors, supervisors, and employees of
railroads and airlines subject to the Railway Labor Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
3 The National Labor Relations Board, created by Congress, performs adjudicative functions, including "the prevention and remedying of unfair labor practices, and the determination of questions concerning employee representation." L. MODJESKA, NLRB PRACTICE § 1.1,
at 7 (1983). In exercising these functions, the Board has wide discretion. Id. at 8.
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volving well-developed, 4-year traditional colleges, the record is clear: in
light of Yeshiva, university administrations have prevailed eight times
without suffering a loss. However, Yeshiva may not be the only reason in
the 1980's for the decline of faculty to organize successfully for purposes
of collective bargaining.
The purpose of this Article is threefold: (1) to review the Yeshiva
decision and the Court's rationale (sections I and II); (2) to critically analyze the majority opinion (section III); and (3) to indicate the nature,
scope and impact of the decision by discussing recent cases based on
Yeshiva (sections IV and V).

I
On February 20, 1980, the Supreme Court decided Yeshiva by a 5-4
margin,4 holding that the faculty members of Yeshiva University are not
covered by the Act because of their managerial status. 5 The immediate
and direct effect of the decision was to force the Board to re-examine the
10-year period (1970-1980) during which its interpretations of the scope
of the Act had widened to include private, non-profit institutions of
higher education. During this period, the application of the Act to such
institutions was justified on two grounds: (1) higher education impacts
significantly on interstate commerce; and (2) the distinction between
commercial and non-commercial activities is no longer clear.'
The Board's jurisdiction is based on the commerce clause; therefore, the Board seeks to
exclude cases that do not affect commerce. W. OBERER & K. HANSLOWE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 228 (1972). To this end, the
Board has developed " 'dollar volume' standards" in measuring the impact of particular industries on interstate commerce. Id.
' Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined, dissented.
' 444 U.S. at 679. Yeshiva University opposed the effort by the Yeshiva University Faculty
Association to become the bargaining agent for the full-time faculty members at 10 of the
University's 13 schools. Id. at 674-75. A hearing officer appointed by the NLRB held hearings at which evidence was proferred showing that the Board of Trustees possessed ultimate
authority while policy formulation lay in the hands of the central administration subject to
the approval of the Trustees. Id. at 675. Faculty participation in university-wide government occurs through representatives on an elected student-faculty advisory council. Id. at
675-76. The Faculty Review Committee, which is the only university-wide faculty body,
makes purely advisory recommendations to the dean of a specific school or to the president.
Id. at 676. Faculty within each school make decisions regarding academic policy. Id. In addition, faculty involvement extends to making "recommendations to the Dean or Director in
every case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion." Id. at 677.
Some faculties make binding decisions affecting the matriculation, expulsion, and graduation of individual students. Id. Others have resolved issues relating to teaching loads, student absenteeism, tuition and enrollment levels and location of a school. Id.
' For a clarification of the factors upon which the Board based its decision to extend the
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Thus, by the time the Yeshiva faculty sought to unionize, the Board
had extended the Act's coverage to full-time faculty members, consistently holding during the 1970's that such personnel are neither supervisory nor managerial and hence are protected by the Act.' The Board,
then, following these earlier decisions, rejected the claim of managerial
status and permitted a vote' at Yeshiva University based on a bargaining
unit composed of regular full-time faculty members,9 department chairmen, and assistant deans, but excluding deans and part-time or nontenure-track teachers.' 0
Adhering to the position that the personnel in the designated bargaining unit were supervisory and managerial and hence not protected by
the Act, Yeshiva refused to bargain." Claiming unfair labor practices, the
Board ordered the University to bargain 2 and sought enforcement in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit refused to enforce
the Board's order, concluding that the faculty played an important role in
determining many integral policies of the University and thus should be
accorded managerial status.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari"' and
Act to private, nonprofit colleges and universities, see Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 33033 (1970). In Cornell, the first case to extend the Act's coverage to such institutions, the
court based its jurisdiction on a need for federal regulation of union organization on college
campuses. The Board noted the lack of state activity in the area and held that the need for
a uniform system of dispute resolution warranted the extension of its jurisdiction. Id. at 334.
7 See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 250 (1975) (faculty decisionmaking on
collective basis illustrates faculty's non-managerial status); University of Miami, 213
N.L.R.B. 634, 634 (1974) (collective decisionmaking exercised in faculty's interest, not employer's); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 5 (1973) (infrequent exercise of supervisory authority does not align faculty with management).
A principle focus in Yeshiva, to be discussed shortly, see infra notes 18-58 and accompanying text, is whether faculty members are managers.
8 Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975), rev'd, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), af'd,

444 U.S. 672 (1980).
9 Full-time faculty include those "appointed to the University in the titles of professor,
associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, or any adjunct or visiting thereof, department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant deans." Id. at 1057. The
prerequisites for "full-time faculty" are that they possess appointment letters from the president, and are eligible for tenure and sabbatical leave. See id.
1o Id.

" Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (1977), rev'd, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444
U.S. 672 (1980).
'1
231 N.L.R.B. at 597.
"3 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 703 (2d Cir. 1978), afl'd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). The
Second Circuit found that the faculty at Yeshiva University were not merely "exercising
individual professional expertise," but instead were "substantially and pervasively operating
the enterprise." 582 F.2d at 698. The court emphasized that the faculty exercised control
over courses taught, placement of teachers, teaching hours required, and the rank, salary,
and tenure status of faculty members. Id. In addition, Judge Mulligan, writing for the court,
stressed that full-time faculty participate in the determination of the institution's central
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upheld the Second Circuit decision. 5
II

Yeshiva is a decision that offers two clear and distinct positions. In
this section, these two conflicting views (the majority and minority opin-

ions) will be discussed.
The majority noted at the outset that prior to 1970' the prevailing
view regarding collective bargaining in higher education had been that
university faculties could not organize for collective bargaining under the
Act since "they were employed by non-profit institutions which did not
'affect commerce.' 1"7The Court also stated that "the authority structure
of a university does not fit neatly within the statutory scheme, '

18

and

that the scope of the Yeshiva decision is limited to consideration of managerial rather than supervisory status. 9 The context, then, within which a
conclusion would be reached was clear; first, what is meant by "managerial" employees, and, second, does the university's authoritative structure
entail faculty members serving managerial functions? The Court's first
task, then, was to define and clarify the term "managerial employee."
Citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,' 0 Justice Powell, writing for the

majority, defined managerial employees as "those who 'formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.' "21 More specifically, managerial employees
must be in alignment with management and must exercise discretion
within policy guidelines established by the employer. 2
policies. Id.
14

440 U.S. 906 (1979).

15 444 U.S. at 691.

16See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970); supra note 6.
17 444 U.S. at 679-80.
18 Id. at 680.
'9 Id. at 682. The effect of the Court's decision not to address the faculty's supervisory
status is that assuming a Court reversal, Yeshiva's administration will be able to refuse to
bargain on the grounds that the faculty is supervisory. For further humorous twists which
may issue from the Yeshiva decision, see J. DOUGLAS, ISSUES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR
NURSES 810 (1981).
o 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974).
21 444 U.S. at 682 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (quoting
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947))).
2 444 U.S. at 683. A more specific definition of a managerial employee than that given in
Yeshiva is contained in Labor Relations, BNA Policy and Practice Series, 10:207
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Labor Relations]. Therein, a managerial employee is defined as
(1) one who, while not a supervisor, is so closely related to or aligned with management as to present a potential conflict of interest between employer and employee;
and (2) one who formulates, or effectuates an employer's policies, and who has discretion in the performance of his job, but not if the discretion must conform to the
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Clearly, the determination of employees as part of management is a
judgment call. In making that call, the Board had relied on four criteria:
(1) Is the individual a "professional" within the Act's section 152(12)
definition?
(2) To the extent that he exercises authority which in other contexts might
be considered managerial, does he exercise that authority collectively with
his peers rather than individually?
(3) Does he, in exerting that authority, act in his own interest rather than
that of management?
(4) Are his decisions subject to reversal by a higher authority?28
Affirmative responses to these questions indicate that employees are rank
and file rather than managerial.2 4 In Yeshiva, the Board, after considering
these criteria, contended that although the faculty "appear to be exercising managerial authority," they are, in fact, "merely performing routine
job duties."2 5 The controlling consideration was the third, or so-called
"alignment with management" criterion."6 According to the Board,
faculty members of Yeshiva University were not aligned with management because they exercised "independent professional judgment" in academic areas, and because they were not expected to be guided by management policies or evaluated as to how well those policies were
effectuated. 27 The Board asserted that this "independence" removed the
danger of divided loyalty (a major goal of the Act) 28 and therefore eliminated the need to apply the managerial exclusion.29
The Yeshiva majority responded to the Board's arguments by stating
that the four criteria employed in faculty cases had "transformed . . .
into a litany to be repeated in case after case: (i) faculty authority is collective, (ii) it is exercised in the faculty's own interest rather than in the
interest of the university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board of
trustees."30 This "litany" had no basis in laws' and, the Court noted, the
employer's established policies.

Id.
21

Casey, Judicial Interference with the NLRB: Yeshiva University and the Definition of

"Managerial," 14 AKRON L. REV. 591, 603 (1981); see also Recent Development, Full-Time
Faculty Held Not To Be "Employees" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 FoRDHAM L. REV. 437, 440-41 (1978) (discussing derivation of criteria for classification).
24 Casey, supra note 23, at 603.
25 444 U.S. at 683-84.
16 Id. at 684-85.
27 Id.
at 684.
28 Id.
29 Id.; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 n.20 (1974) (Board may exclude
employees from bargaining unit if their participation in union would result in "conflict of
interest with their job responsibilities").
30 444 U.S. at 685 (citations omitted).
3' See Recent Development, supra note 23, at 442-43; Recent Decision, A University
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Board "ha[d] never explained the reasoning connecting the premise with
the conclusion" that in each case the faculty were not managerial
employees.3 2
Due to this patent weakness, the Court quickly dismissed the first
and third of the aforementioned Board arguments. 33 Justice Powell observed that the Board, after acknowledging that these rationales were not
legal rationales, had abandoned both in its oral arguments before the
Court.34 Furthermore, the Court noted that the third point-that faculty
members are not managers because final authority is vested in the board
of trustees-was simply unsound since "[u]ltimate authority . . . has
never been thought to be a prerequisite to supervisory or managerial status. Indeed, it could not be since every corporation vests that power in its
board of directors."3 5 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he NLRB and
the courts have never held that to be a managerial employee one must be
at the very pinnacle of corporate power. The exclusion applies to3' persons
exercising managerial, although not necessarily final, authority."
The primary focus of the majority decision rests on a finding that the
faculty exercises authority in the university rather than in their own interest, and that, if it were unionized, its loyalty would be divided between
employer and union. 37 The fundamental argument advanced by the Court
in support of this view is as follows:
The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva
University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably
would be managerial. Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They
decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to
whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods,
grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which
students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion their views
have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and
the location of a school. When one considers the function of a university, it
Faculty with a Record of ManagerialActivity May Be Managerial Personnel and Therefore Excluded From the Coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, 13 GA. L. REV. 313,
316 (1978).
" 444 U.S. at 685 n.19.
Id. at 685.
" Id. Justice Powell observed that "[a]lthough the Board has preserved the [first and third]
points in footnotes to its brief, it no longer contends that 'collective authority' and 'lack of
ultimate authority' are legal rationales." Id. at 685 n.20.
Furthermore, the first argument was correctly rejected since it rests on the unsound
rationale that managerial authority cannot be undertaken by groups. The Supreme Court,
1979 Term, The ManagerialStatus of Faculty Members Under the National Labor Relations Act, 94 HARV. L. REV. 251, 257 (1980).
" 444 U.S. at 685 n.21.
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 34, at 257.
" 444 U.S. at 686-88.
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is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the extent
the industrial analogy applies, the faculty determines within each school the
product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the
customers who will be served. 8
Finally, in response to the fourth argument proffered by the Board-that
the faculty exercised independent professional judgment-the Court argued that such a determination was inconsistent and unjustified.3 9 Justice
Powell noted that the Court had been directed to no authority suggesting
that the tension between the Act's inclusion of professionals and exclusion of managers could be resolved by deciding whether a given employee
had exercised independent professional judgment. 0
The Court, then, rejected all Board arguments, and found, essentially, that faculty members at Yeshiva were managerial and hence not
subject to the Act's protection because "the faculty's professional interests. . . cannot be separated from those of the institution.""' The majority concluded its opinion by acknowledging the respect owed to the Board
"when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act."'4 2 In this case, the Court asserted, neither condition-rationality or consistency-was met.43
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan 44 maintained that the Board's
decision was rational and consistent with the Act' as evidenced by the
following observations:
(1) Since the Act does not address the issue of faculty status, the
46
Board, in its discretion, may determine applicable standards.
(2) Although the majority found that the faculty's authority, if exercised "in any other context," would be managerial in nature,4" Justice
Brennan observed that "the academic community is simply not 'any other
context.' "48 Justice Brennan acknowledged that extensive hearings had
s8

Id. at 686.

19Id. at 688; see Comment, NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 369, 373 (1981).
The Court identified the independent professional judgment argument as incompatible with
prior decisions of the Board. 444 U.S. at 687. Those prior decisions had not inquired into
the managerial element of the decisions made, but rather used the managerial and supervisory exclusions in the treatment of professionals. Id. Since the Board in Yeshiva had not
confined the test to university faculty, the Court deduced that the Board's approach would
overrule Board precedent and characterize supervisory professionals as nonmanagerial. Id.
4" 444 U.S. at 686-87.
4' Id. at 688.
41 Id. at 691.
4I

Id.

Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
444 U.S. at 692 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id.
at 692-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 686.
48 Id.
at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that even though the majority
14

41
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been conducted by the Board to determine whether the faculty represented their own interests or those of their employer.49 After noting that
the Board had decided that the faculty represent their own interests, Justice Brennan concluded that the findings of the Board were consistent
with the Act.50
(3) Rejecting the industrial analogy, Justice Brennan, after examining the structure of the modern university, concluded that educators act
in their "own independent interest in creating the most effective environment for learning, teaching, and scholarship."51 In addition, while the
university may defer to the faculty in formulating academic policy, the
administration nevertheless applies its own perspective "based on fiscal
and other managerial policies which the faculty has no part in developing."5'2 Continuing, Justice Brennan argued that faculty members are
managerial only if they are answerable to some higher authority.5"
Faculty members, however, are not subject to a higher authority as are
their counterparts in industry, since they are not hired to carry out the
employer's policies and decisions.5 4 Rather, faculty members are hired
and retained on the basis of teaching ability and scholarly contributions.5
recognized that the authority structures of the industrial and academic institutions are inherently and fundamentally different, Justice Powell declined to apply this fact to his analysis. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court's approach has been denounced as
"caus[ing] faculty members to be treated not as a group entitled to unique standards, but as
typical professional employees." Recent Decision, supra note 31, at 380. Clearly, in the
"shared-authority system" of a university, industrial authority standards should not be applied. Id.
'
444 U.S. at 696 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6oId. at 694-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The major consideration in defining managerial
status is whether the interests of the employee or the employer are being represented by the
actions of the employee. Id. at 695-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If an employee is acting on
his own behalf, he is not subject to conflicting loyalties and is therefore covered by the Act.
Id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While the hierarchical nature of a university places
authority with the administration, there is also "a parallel professional network" which uses
the faculty's expertise in the decisionmaking process. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 697-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's view has been lauded as an approach which focuses on the faculty member's participation in the decisionmaking process.
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 34, at 259.
444 U.S. at 699-700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
444 U.S. at 700 (Brennan, J., dissenting). University professors, unlike industrial managers and supervisors, are not hired to implement the policies and decisions of their employer.
Id. at 699-700 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, a faculty member's employment is not
conditioned upon the possession of interests which correspond to those of the administration. Id. at 700 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, the dissent observed, university professors
must exhibit competence in teaching and scholarship. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). It has
been noted that "a teacher's role in making recommendations or formulating policy gives no
indication of his orientation toward or away from management." The Supreme Court, 1979
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In addition, coincidence of interest on any number of issues does not preclude the right to collective bargaining.56
(4) Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's perception of the
modern university as a remnant of the great medieval universities. 7 As
he observed, "[e]ducation has become 'big business,' and the task of operating the university enterprise has been transformed from the faculty to
an autonomous administration . . . . " Given this observation, Justice
Brennan concluded that the collective bargaining process could result in
peaceful resolution of disagreements, which in turn would serve the original intent of the Act. 9
Thus, argued Justice Brennan, given the Board's discretionary power,
the rejection of the industrial analogy, the finding that faculty overwhelmingly represent their own interests, and the autonomy of modern
university administrations, the Board's decision was rational and consistent with the Act, and should have been sustained.
III
An examination of the soundness of any legal decision commits the
Term, supra note 34, at 258. Faculty members who merely make recommendations regarding professional matters are not aligned with the "bureaucratic network." Id. at 259.
50 444 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In any institution, the interests of management
and labor never totally diverge, since the interests of the employer will always be promoted
by the performance of the employee's duties. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
there may be differences of opinion within an institution, but goals of stability and profitable operations are present at all levels. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
pointed out that the similarity of interests at the university is not well-defined. For instance, the faculty does not share in the economic and fiduciary responsibilities of the administration. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Also, the interests of professors in the areas
where collective bargaining would be used, such as wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment, are opposed to the administration's interests. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One commentator has recognized the failure of the Court to consider the distinctions among
the differing faculty roles. Benson, To Bargain or Govern: The Impact of Yeshiva on Private and Public Sector Collective Bargainingin HigherEducation, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 259,
271 (1980). It has been suggested that the reliance on the employer's adherence to employee
recommendations "plac[es] in serious doubt the bargaining rights of all employees who aspire to influence their employer's policy." Osborne, The Need for Legislation After Yeshiva,
9 J.L. & EDUc. 465, 477 (1980).
57 444 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan attributes "the erosion of the faculty's
role in the decisionmaking process" to budget cutbacks, decreasing enrollments, abatement
of faculty appointments, diminishing of academic programs, and "increasing calls for accountability to alumni and other special interest groups." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 705 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In recent years, many faculties have sought relief
from the "strikes and work stoppages" that have disturbed several universities by entering
into collective bargaining relationships with their administrations. Id. at 704 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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logical fallacy of complex question. The initial question that should be
answered is whether the courts have a legitimate interest in this area.
Should they be deciding the contested issue at all? This Article assumes
that the Court had a legitimate right to intervene in this area. It should
be kept in mind, however, that intervention may have been
unwarranted. 0
A critical review of the majority opinion raises several important issues, five of which will be examined.
The first is the relationship between the facts of the case and the
interpretation proffered by the majority. The faculty, so the argument
goes, effectively governs the university by its participation on committees
which recommend policy regarding the school's "curriculum, grading system, admission and matriculation standards, academic calendars, and
course schedules," as well as salary and conditions of employment.6 ' In
addition, "the faculty make recommendations to the Dean or Director in
every case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion, 's 2 and "the overwhelming majority of faculty recommendations are
'
implemented. '63
In fact, over 90% of all recommendations are given ef'
fect." These assertions of fact, unfortunately, commit two fallacies:
ignoratio elenchi and post hoc ergo propter hoc. First, what is the relevance of the 90% test to the claim of managerial status (ignoratio elenchi)?6 Second, what is the proper causal relationship between the faculty
recommendations and the administrative action (post hoc ergo propter
hoc)?"6 The Court has erred here in that it assumes what it needs to
prove. In addition, the majority is guilty of the precise violation that it
" See Casey, supra note 23, at 587-608.
444 U.S. at 676.
'2 Id. at 677.
0d

d.

Id. at 677 n.5.
e The fact that a high percentage of faculty recommendations are accepted and implemented by the administration of Yeshiva can not, of itself, transform employees into management. If such were not the case, absurd hypotheticals would abound. For example, as the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated in 1977, "a janitor does not
become a supervisor merely because his superior invariably indulges his requests for assistance." Stop & Shop Cos. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1977); see Benson, supra note
56, at 271.
An example of the failure of the Court to examine the causation underlying administrative actions is the following quotation from the majority opinion: "[tlhe Director of
Teacher's Institute for Women once recommended that the school move to Brooklyn to
attract students. The faculty rejected the proposal and the school remained in Manhattan."
444 U.S. at 677 n.6. It is too simplistic to attach to one-the faculty rejection of the proposal-the tag of proximate cause while ignoring other possible reasons for the school remaining in Manhattan.
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has accused the Board of committing; 1 namely, the failure to examine
the facts of the case. Thus, a double standard has been introduced that
allows the Court to arrive at conclusions without evaluating the underlying facts.
For one example of the failure of the Court to examine the relevant
facts, consider the following comment addressed to the Court's contention
that faculty are involved in establishing admission standards: "Anyone
who knows how a college or university functions is aware of the subtle
differences between letting faculty members serve on an admission committee, for instance, and having the admissions staff solicit applications
from students with low SAT scores and enough money to pay tuition." 68
Although financial standards invariably override academic standards, the
Court never analyzed this or any other factual issue. To use the Court's
own language, it would not be indefensible to hold that the Court reached
its decision "on the basis of conclusory rationales rather than examination of the facts of each case."6"
The second consideration is that the Court made no attempt to explore "the reasons why these deans and directors felt compelled to adopt
faculty committee and departmental recommendations most of the
time. ' 70 A correct decision could have been arrived at only if an examination had been made into the reasons for acceptance and rejection of
faculty recommendations. 7 ' For example, faculty morale, not managerial
status, may have led the administration to accept faculty
recommendations.
Third, the Court erred when it asserted that faculty speak for management rather than for themselves as employees. The following comments are directed to this point: (1) "The conclusion [that faculty speak
for management] is erroneous because in the process of reaching a recommendation, the faculty draw upon their professional, not their managerial, judgment." 2 (2) "Although patterns of authority in private industry
may support the presumption that policymaking responsibility automatically translates into alignment with management, a teacher's role in makId. at 691. Justice Powell stated that the issue to be decided was a mixture of law and
fact. Id. The Board, the majority added, did not include any relevant findings of fact in its
opinion, thus "reflect[ing] the Board's view that the managerial status of particular faculties
may be decided on the basis of conclusory rationales rather than examination of the facts of
each case." Id.
Maerhoff, Taking Stock After Yeshiva, EDUc. REC. 17 (Summer 1980); see Benson, supra
note 56, at 271.
11 444 U.S. at 691. For a discussion of the Court's failure to evaluate the facts underlying its
rationale in Yeshiva, see Benson, supra note 56, at 267-70.
70 Benson, supra note 56, at 269.
71 Id.; See Casey, supra note 23, at 606.
" Benson, supra note 56, at 270.
67
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ing recommendations or formulating policy gives no indication of his orientation toward or away from management."73 (3) "The majority of the
Supreme Court really did not understand the functioning of a modernday university and how the governing structure works. . . . The Court
said in the Yeshiva decision that the authority of the faculty was absolute. It is really very hard to believe that there are any academic matters
in which this is true and I say that as one who has worked in a university
for a long time. '74 (4) "The very fact that Yeshiva's faculty has voted for
the Union to serve as its representative in future negotiations with the
administration indicates that the faculty does not perceive its interests to
'75
be aligned with those of management.
A fourth consideration is that one of the roles of the faculty (at
Yeshiva or any other university) is to secure for themselves better wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment. This role is contrary to
managerial responsibility in either higher education or industry. Here,
Justice Brennan is on target: "Indeed, on the precise topics which are
specified as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining-wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment-the interests of teacher
and administrator are often diametrically opposed. '76 Reinforcing this dichotomy is the relevant observation by Joel M. Douglas:
The decision of the Court is difficult to reconcile with the management axiom that the primary responsibility for decision-making be centralized in an
administrative hierarchy and not with the entire work force. Therefore, it is
difficult to understand how faculty, both individually and collectively, can
be precluded7 from seeking to influence management to improve their own
7
work place.

A fifth observation was made by Dena Benson:
[I]f the faculty operate an enterprise, they don't need a union. They have
the power and the right, if they truly operate the enterprise, to grant to
themselves whatever they would have chosen to negotiate at the bargaining
table. It is inconceivable that the Court could have intended such a
conclusion .7
While there are additional difficulties with the decision 7 9 these are
73
74

The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 34, at 258.
Maerhoff, supra note 68, at 17.

444 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77 Douglas, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: An Appraisal of Its Impact, 30 C. & U. PERSONNEL A.J. 30 (Fall 1979).
71 Benson, supra note 56, at 272.
71

T' Other criticisms of the decision include:
(1) Application of the Yeshiva standard will entail undue expense and delay. See Benson, supra note 56, at 273; Osborne, supra note 56, at 466.
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among the most serious flaws in the Court's reasoning. The problems will
persist until such time that Yeshiva is overruled legislatively or judicially.
Meanwhile, one must recognize that labor law in the area of higher education has changed radically as a result of Yeshiva. In a recent case, for
example, the Board wrote: "We conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in Yeshiva constitutes a substantial change in the state of the law
regarding the supervisory and/or managerial status of faculty members
.
-"8o The nature and scope of that change will now be addressed by
examining recent decisions in light of Yeshiva.
IV
The disposition of cases that have considered Yeshiva in one manner
or another may be divided into three categories: (1) resolution through
negotiation; (2) Yeshiva claims rejected; and (3) Yeshiva considered as
controlling precedent. Superficially, it appears that the effects of Yeshiva
are not great, for, after all, ten such claims have been rejected and only
eight upheld, with another eight resolved through negotiation. Careful
scrutiny of these cases, however, reveals a much dimmer outlook for the
future of faculty unionization in higher education, as the following comment underscores: " 'Yeshiva-watchers' will note that the quantitative
record thus far is mixed, while the qualitative record clearly comes down
in favor of management. The unions have not won a single case that may
be considered controlling in any manner.""' A brief look at these categories will reveal that the greatest fear about Yeshiva-that unionization in
higher education is dead-is not unfounded. To appreciate fully the nature of decisionmaking in light of Yeshiva, the cases will be examined in
the following order: (1) Yeshiva claims rejected; (2) Yeshiva claims resolved through negotiation; and (3) Yeshiva claims upheld.
In the ten years in which results similar to those reached in Yeshiva
were rejected by the NLRB, the courts or state labor agencies have not
(2) The Court created a dichotomy between bargaining and governance. Benson, supra
note 56, at 272. The possible ramifications of such a dichotomy include the administration's
delegation of authority to faculty boards merely to avoid collective bargaining. Id. at 273.
Similarly, institutions desirous of maintaining administrative autonomy might devise strategies to avoid collective bargaining and, in so doing, increase academic friction. Id. at 274.
Moreover, the faculty might withdraw from active committee participation for fear of losing
their bargaining rights. Id.
(3) The decision forces the Board to develop new criteria for determining faculty status.
Recent Decision, supra note 31, at 380.
(4) Yeshiva's usefulness is limited to closely related factual situations. See Casey, supra
note 23, at 604.
00 Milton College, 260 N.L.R.B. 399, 400 (1982).
83 Newsletter, 10 National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions 3 (Aug./Sept. 1982).
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clarified the scope and impact of Yeshiva for faculty at private, 4-year
traditional colleges.8 2 For example, both University of Alaska,3 and
4
Wichita State University"
deal with public, not private, institutions.
The potential impact of Yeshiva on the public sector will be discussed
briefly later, but for private sector purposes, the cases are irrelevant and
nondispositive. Pratt Institute5 also is irrelevant, as it addresses the issue of the managerial status of non-faculty administrative employees.
The remaining cases are equally uninformative and irrelevant. Montefiore
Hospital and Medical Center" concerns the managerial status of hospital
staff doctors. In Stephens Institute v. NLRB, s7 which dealt with a proprietary art school, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
maintained that Stephens Institute is not a "mature" university comparable to Yeshiva University and that the instructors at the academy do not
share a policy-making role."8 Similarly, Florida Memorial College"9 involved a faculty that did not exercise managerial authority and English
82

Stephens Inst. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1980) (Yeshiva does not apply to

instructors who do not engage in management level decisionmaking), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
953 (1980); Florida Memorial College, 263 N.L.R.B. 1248, 1254 (1982) (faculty not considered managerial employees because they exercise no control and do not make effective recommendations); Wordsworth Academy, 262 N.L.R.B. 438, 443 (1982) (Yeshiva not applicable since the teachers are simply professional employees with decisionmaking limited to
routine professional matters); Bradford College, 261 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (1982) (faculty not
comprised of managerial employees since their recommendations are consistently ignored);
Montefiore Hosp. and Medical Center, 261 N.L.R.B. 569, 571-72 (1982) (staff doctors with
faculty appointments are not managerial employees since department chairmen exercise
managerial functions); Pratt Inst., 256 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1167 (1981) (Yeshiva-like managerial
status rejected because of employees' routine function of carrying out decisions that have
been already decided by higher authority); English Language Inst. of Am. Univ., 5-RC11743 (1982); University of Alaska, UA-80-2 (1980); Wichita State Univ., 75-UD-1 (PERB
1980).
83 UA-80-2 (1980).
75-UD-1 (PERB 1980).
88 256 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1981).
88 261 N.L.R.B. 569 (1982).
87 620 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 727 (1980). The court in Stephens also distinguished the role of the faculty at the
art school from that of the faculty at Yeshiva. Id. The faculty at Stephens had no input into
policy decisions or any other managerial decision making. Id.
89 263 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1982). In Florida Memorial, the faculty was found to be "not responsible for the formulation or effectuation of management policies." Id. at 1249. Indeed, meetings of committees composed of faculty members were used simply as a vehicle for faculty
announcements. Id. Furthermore, not all committees had faculty on them, and many which
did met infrequently and were not empowered to make decisions. Id. Faculty recommendations were considered by the administration and adopted if they seemed "sound." Id. In
distinguishing Yeshiva, the court noted that the Yeshiva faculty exercised absolute authority in academic matters, and that faculty authority extended beyond purely academic concerns. Id; see Douglas, Distinguishing Yeshiva: A Troubling Task for the NLRB, 34 LAB.
L.J. 108 (1983).
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Language Institute of American University" was concerned with a special institute. What it means for a faculty to exercise no managerial authority is best exemplified by Bradford College,91 which concerned a junior college with somewhat paleolithic working conditions including
alterations of students' grades by the administration without notice to the
faculty and demotions of full-time faculty to part-time status "despite
contrary recommendations from the division chairs."92
An examination of the rejected Yeshiva claims reveals a pattern of
irrelevant, unique, unusual, or abnormal conditions surrounding employees alleged to be managerial. Thus, one looks in vain to these cases to
discover the meaning, scope, and impact of Yeshiva on the majority of
private, 4-year traditional colleges. A clearer picture of the impact of
Yeshiva begins to emerge from those cases that were resolved through
negotiation. Nevertheless, the eight Yeshiva claims that have been resolved in such a manner93 leave the question of union status in higher
education unresolved.
In three of these cases-Curry College, Daemaen College, and Ashland College-the AAUP used its certification status (granted respectively in 1979, 1972, and 1979) as a bargaining chip to achieve new agreements. 4 However favorable the short-term gain was, the chip has been
played and is no longer available for bargaining purposes.
The remaining cases in this category are as interesting as they are
confusing. In Cottey College, a 2-year successor agreement was negotiated. While the administration in that case withdrew its Yeshiva claim,
the long-term status of the union remained uncertain. 95 In Drury College,
the Yeshiva decision was clearly avoided when a settlement was reached
"which incorporated a 'philosophy of governance' and also implemented a
'meet and confer' policy . . . result[ing] in both parties dropping all
Yeshiva-related court actions." 96 The C.W. Post and Southhampton decisions included the "sign[ing] [of] multi-year agreements in which the em90

5-RC-11743 (1982).

9' 261 N.L.R.B. 565 (1982).
92 Id. at 566. Among other things, the dean of Bradford College engaged in faculty evaluation without consulting department chairs. Id. Similarly, the dean cancelled programs despite faculty protests, and transferred items from the academic budget to the academic
dean's budget. Id.
9' See Milton College, 260 N.L.R.B. 399 (1982); Drury College, 244 N.L.R.B. 747 (1979);
Ashland College, 8-CA-13 (1981); Daemaen College, 3-CA-92-11 (1981); Curry College, 1CA-17 (1980). For the Cottey College, C.W. Post College and Southhampton College decisions, see Newsletter, supra note 81, at 12.
" See Ashland College, 8-CAS-13 (1981); Daemaen College, 3-CA-94-11 (1981); Curry College, 1-CA-17 (1980).
"
96

See Newsletter, supra note 81, at 12.
Douglas, supra note 77, at 106.
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ployers voluntarily recognized that unions acknowledged no NLRB jurisdiction over the faculty. 9 7 Finally, Milton College,98 which had unionized
in 1979, closed in May, 1982, leaving the legal status of the union moot.
While no clear and distinct conclusions can be drawn from these
cases, two points merit attention. First, it is possible for unionized faculty
to use their status as a bargaining chip to negotiate new working agreements. Second, institutions may continue to engage in the process of collective bargaining if such an agreement is viewed as mutually advantageous and beneficial. It should be noted, however, that the continuation
of collective bargaining at these institutions, as well as at others where
the union enjoys continued health, appears to be contingent upon administrations realizing that collective bargaining is salubrious. As one commentator has observed, "unions are, of course, still free to organize and
bargain collectively. However, they can no longer do so under the protection of the NLRA. Nor can they use the Board as an organizing
weapon." 9 In this regard, Yeshiva has contributed to a weakening of
union strength, for colleges may now make veiled threats to invoke
Yeshiva in the bargaining process. In the long run, such a relationship is
not conducive to collective bargaining, for the veiled threats are available
to only one party. Accordingly, it appears that the existence of the unions
at these colleges is in jeopardy. This conclusion is reinforced by considering the last group of cases that illustrate the real impact of Yeshiva.
There have been eight cases decided along the lines of Yeshiva. 100 In
terms of clarifying the nature, scope and impact of Yeshiva, the most
instructive of the cases is Ithaca College.' The Board in Ithaca observed
that in Yeshiva, the faculty possessed complete discretion to shape the
academic structure of the university. 102 Furthermore, the faculty played a
significant role in formulating institutional policies of the university; the
administration's ultimate authority to make policy decisions did not ob97

Id.

- 260 N.L.R.B. 399 (1982).
" Douglas, supra note 77, at 117. The Yeshiva decision casts doubt on the right of faculty
to bargain collectively, Osborne, supra note 56, at 465; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term,
supra note 34, at 252, and poses a severe threat to unionization at private universities where
faculty members routinely engage in some policy making through the giving of advice, id. at
260. Although it does not entirely foreclose the employees' ability to bargain, the Yeshiva
decision significantly impairs this ability. Osborne, supra note 56, at 476.
100 Catholic Univ. of Am. Law School, 86 LC
12,157 (D.C. Cir. 1980); University of New
Haven, 267 N.L.R.B., No. 149 (1983); Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 261 N.L.R.B. 587
(1982); Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. 580 (1982); Ithaca College, 261 N.L.R.B. 577 (1982);
Wagner College, 29-UC-147 (1982); University of Albuquerque, NLRB 28-UC-106 (1980);
Ohio N. Univ., 8-RC-11, 710 (1979).
Ithaca College, 261 N.L.R.B. 577 (1982).
101 Id.
at 578.
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scure the faculty's role in this process.0 s Therefore, the Board concluded,
the faculty in Yeshiva was properly characterized as a managerial body
and thus beyond the purview of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board, turning to the facts at hand, found that the faculty at
Ithaca College exercised authority of a substantially similar nature to that
exercised by the faculty at Yeshiva University."0 " Examples, cited by the
Board, of the pervasive control possessed by the Ithaca faculty included
the "extensive authority to formulate and effectuate policies" at the college's respective schools;0 5 the faculty's "absolute authority as to the curriculum;"' 0 6 and the fact that "the faculty possesses substantial authority
in spheres beyond the strictly academic" such as the hiring of faculty and
deans, the controlling of budgetary matters and the planning of faculties.'0 7 Similar findings were made in Thiel College' and Duquesne University of the Holy Ghost.'0 9
Given the disposition of these Yeshiva-based claims at institutions
that are more representative of the modern-day university (such as those
envisioned by Justice Brennan), 1 0 it can safely be concluded that future
union organization at most private, 4-year colleges is without legal standing and is, therefore, dead. Rarely, if ever, will a college be encountered
that follows the "immature" managerial model of Bradford College."'
The nature of the Yeshiva decision, then, is that it radically alters
faculty status under NLRA guidelines. The scope of that change covers
most, and, for all practical purposes, all, modern 4-year private colleges.
Moreover, the impact of Yeshiva is that it brings collective bargaining for
faculty in higher education to a virtual stop. These conclusions, however,
are general. In the next section, seven specific consequences of the
Yeshiva decision will be presented.
103

Id.

104

Id.

105Id.
106Id.
107 Id.
'08261 N.L.R.B. 580 (1982). In Thiel, the Board made frequent reference to Yeshiva, noting
that the kind and sweep of authority which was possessed by the Yeshiva faculty, and which
was dispositive in that case, was present at Thiel in nearly identical form. Id. at 586. Although acknowledging that the board of trustees was vested with ultimate authority, the
Board found that the professional interests of the faculty, like those of the Yeshiva faculty,
were closely aligned with the employer's interests, thus removing the faculty members from
the Act's coverage. Id. The Board was therefore constrained by Yeshiva to dismiss the petition. Id.
'" 261 N.L.R.B. 587 (1982). The Board in Duquesne found that the authority exercised by
the law school faculty was "nearly identical to that possessed by the faculty in Yeshiva,"
and thus found the faculty members to be managerial employees. Id. at 589.
"'
See 444 U.S. at 702-03; supra text accompanying notes 57 & 58.
"'
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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V
Some of the more noteworthy consequences of the Yeshiva decision
include the following:
First, Yeshiva has rendered the inclusion of faculty under the Act, if
not improper, at least ambiguous. This, in turn, could have deleterious
consequences. One commentator has noted that the rejection of assumptions formed during ten years of Board decisions "assures-at least in
contested cases-an expensive and frequently perplexing fact-finding process prior to Board certification of a faculty union. After Yeshiva it will
not be possible, in most cases, to know in advance whether or not an
institution's faculty are covered by the . ..Act." 1 2 Another commentator has noted that "many private-sector colleges have come to realize that
challenges to Yeshiva cost too much in terms of time and money."" 3 The
undesirable consequences, then, include the following possibilities: (1) the
process to achieve faculty bargaining rights will be unnecessarily burdensome; (2) the expense and delay of certification may well prove prohibitive; (3) the principles of the Act are frustrated due to delaying tactics
that prohibit speedy elections for majority status; and (4) elections may
11 4
prove ephemeral.
Second, despite the oft-quoted footnote 31 in Yeshiva," 5 which was
designed to limit the scope of the decision, any "evidence of a collegial
structure of authority" will compel the Board "to exclude such faculty
Osborne, supra note 56, at 466. The result of the Yeshiva Court's rejection of the
Board's use of a "ritualistic formula" in adjudicating faculty unionization cases will be to
require an expensive and lengthy inquiry in each case. Id. at 467.
113 Kuechle, Yeshiva Shock Waves, 52 HARV. EDUc. REV. 279 (1982).
14 See generally Benson, supra note 56, at 272-86 (implications of the Yeshiva rule); Os112

borne, supra note 56, at 474-77 (Yeshiva resulted in hazy criteria for determining applicability of the Act).
"1 444 U.S. at 690-91 n.31. At the close of the majority opinion, Justice Powell stated that
the application of the managerial exclusion as applied in Yeshiva should not be viewed as
excluding all faculty at all colleges and universities from the protection of the Act. Id. at
690. Rather, as the Court continued:
We recognize that this is a starting point only, and that other factors not present
here may enter into the analysis in other contexts. It is plain, for example, that
professors may not be excluded merely because they determine the content of their
own courses, evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research. There
thus may be institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty members at
Yeshiva and like universities who properly could be included in a bargaining unit. It
may be that a rational line could be drawn between tenured and untenured faculty
members, depending upon how a faculty is structured and operates. But we express
no opinion on these questions, for it is clear that the unit approved by the Board was
far too broad.
Id. at 690-91 n.31.
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from the protection of the Act." 1 6 Indeed, most, if not all, private sector
faculties will be excluded from the Act's coverage. 7 In this regard, it is
important to note that the NLRB has no specific rule to which one can
look to help determine, in an objective fashion, managerial status. In Ithaca College, for example, managerial status is declared, as it was in
Yeshiva, if an "overwhelming majority of faculty recommendations" are
followed."' Faculty are also managerial if they possess "substantial authority.""" How are we to define an "overwhelming majority"? In Duquesne University, the non-technical and undefinable criterion for managerial status was that the faculty possessed managerial authority "nearly
identical" to that possessed by the Yeshiva faculty.' 2 These nebulous criteria merely exacerbate the problems of applying Yeshiva and leave faculties all the more confused about their status.
Third, the existence of certified bargaining units currently present at
universities will be jeopardized once current collective bargaining agreements expire.' 2 ' Such a possibility has become reality for Curry, Ashland,
and Daemen Colleges 2 and may soon be faced by institutions such as
Cottey, Drury, C.W. Post, and Southhampton. 2 3 With administrations
now in possession of the ultimate trump card, Yeshiva, current union certification is in a precarious position.
Fourth, the Yeshiva decision may lead to an interesting question regarding faculty status: If faculty at a given university do not at first meet
the managerial test and thus escape exclusion, but then unionize and,
subsequently, improve terms and conditions of employment, may the university then claim that new duties and responsibilities preclude the
'" Comment, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: Faculty as Managerial Employees Under the
NLRA, 19 Am.Bus. L.J. 63, 70 (1981); see The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 34,
at 260. One commentator has observed that the Yeshiva decision has established a potentially blanket exclusion of all faculty members at an institution where faculty share governing authority with the administration. Id.; see also Bethel, Private University Professors
and NLRB v. Yeshiva: The Second Circuit's Misconception of Shared Authority and Supervisory Status, 44 Mo. L. REV. 427, 430 (1979) (faculty at mature institutions may be
precluded from bargaining collectively).
"1 See Daponte, PracticalImplications of the Yeshiva Decision, 31 C. & U. PERSONNEL A.J.
45 (Summer 1980). Daponte notes that "[u]nder the managerial exclusion standards set
down by the Court, it is unlikely that few, if any, private sector faculties will be able to be
viewed as not engaging in policy-making." Id.
"1 261 N.L.R.B. at 578.
119 Id.
32 Id.
at 589.
"'
See Douglas, supra note 77, at 35. Shortly after the Yeshiva decision, Douglas stated
that "[wihile existing agreements will not be placed in jeopardy if Yeshiva stands, there is
the possibility that unionized insititutions may refuse to negotiate successor agreements on
the basis of Yeshiva." Id.
" See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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faculty's right to collective bargaining? 12 4 A provoking paradox occurs:
Unionization nullifies unionization; collective bargaining precludes collective bargaining. Such a scenario has become reality in the case of Wagner
College.1" Due to the collective bargaining between the employer and the
union, the terms and conditions of employment were altered. This in turn
altered faculty status, prompting the following observation by the Board:
"Thus, where there is a collective bargaining history, it might also come
to pass that the faculty union, by virtue of its own 'success,' has gained
such authority for its faculty through the bargaining process so as to have
bargained itself out of 'mandatory' bargaining, and, indeed, out of coverage under the Act."12
Fifth, the impact of Yeshiva will extend to the public sector. Following Yeshiva, collective bargaining rights for higher education personnel
may be rescinded, especially since state labor boards and state legislators
are influenced by Board and Supreme Court decisions.1 1 7 In addition,
"state legislatures that have not enacted legislation specifically allowing
for collective bargaining for public university teachers may be most reluctant to enact such legislation if the private sector has no comparable
right. ' 128 In fact, it may be in the public arena where we will witness the
greatest impact of Yeshiva. Since the two public sector claims, University
of Alaska1 2 9 and Wichita State University,"' are not very critical in this
114 Another possible consequence of the Yeshiva decision is that it may be used outside the
academic arena by employers who wish to deny "professional" employees union representation based on managerial claims. See Comment, supra note 116, at 71. Many professional
occupational groups, including "engineers, physicians, lawyers, reporters, [and] editors" will
be vulnerable to the attack that they exert an inordinate amount of influence on broad
policy decisions. Id.; cf. Osborne, supra note 56, at 477 (decision has placed in doubt bargaining rights of all employees seeking to influence employer's policy). Such a scenario
should not be taken lightly. Recently, for example, owners of a drive-in restaurant, on the
basis of Yeshiva, refused to bargain with the employees' bargaining agent. See 20 CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. 3 (June 9, 1980). The owners claimed that new duties and responsibilities
made the workers managerial employees. Id. Thus, it can be seen that the largely undefined
contours of Yeshiva's legal conclusions make predictions as to its extension beyond its particular facts problematic. Osborne, supra note 56, at 474.
125 29-UC-147 (1982).
116

117

Douglas, supra note 89, at 116.
Benson, supra note 56, at 276; Comment, supra note 116, at 71. The decisions of the

National Labor Relations Board are not binding upon state authorities. Benson, supra note
56, at 275. However, many states have drafted collective bargaining legislation patterned
after the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 275-76. Moreover, National Labor Relations
Board decisions have great precedential value in state adjudication of private sector cases.
Id. Also, states contemplating the enactment of collective bargaining statutes may reevaluate the wisdom of granting such rights to public sector teachers in light of the Supreme
Court's failure to confer such rights on their private colleagues. Id.
"0 Comment, supra note 116, at 71; see Kuechle, supra note 113, at 278-79.
129 UA-80-2
(1980).
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regard, 13 ' thie impact of Yeshiva upon claims must await future
decisions.3 2
Sixth, the educational goals of higher education could be frustrated
as a result of Yeshiva. Benson makes this point persuasively:
What the Yeshiva decision will mean to the educational goals of institutions of higher learning is a possible loss of needed faculty guidance in
matters affecting educational policy and faculty conditions of employment.
In reality, neither the institutions nor the faculty have won. Administrators
will have to decide whether to govern and bargain or to relinquish governance to the faculty and avoid bargaining. The faculty will have to decide
whether to govern or to bargain. The institution, designed to serve students,
will suffer regardless of which choice is made. Administrators need the professional judgment and recommendations of faculty on all matters reviewed
by the Court in Yeshiva. Students need teachers who feel their rights are
protected-undistracted from academic concerns." '
A foreseeable development, then, could be the withdrawal of faculty
from all committees and advisory organizations on campus. While nontenured faculty could be "compelled" to serve on committees as a condition for tenure, the experience and knowledge of tenured faculty would be
lost. Faculty morale, and consequently institutional morale, would be low;
academic factions could proliferate. It is important to realize that faculty
may have to make a decision about what they want to be, about how they
want their employment defined. Whatever the decision, it could be costly,
and the only reasons why the decision has to be made at all are directly
attributable to Yeshiva.
Seventh, faculty are being denied the right to bargain collectively at
a time when it is most needed.
The irony of Yeshiva is that it threatens collective bargaining at private
universities at precisely the moment when the faculty is most in need of the
75-UD-1 (PERB 1980).
131See Douglas, supra note 89, at 117-18.
13' The claim that the public sector is ripe for Yeshiva-like cases is supported by David
Kuechle:
[The] effects of the Yeshiva case will continue to be felt for years, especially in states
where public-sector collective bargaining laws are similar to the NLRA. There is no
prospect in the near future of new legislation that would protect faculty members
under the NLRA. Instead, Yeshiva-related action is most likely to take place in the
states, where the stakes for unions are far higher. State collective bargaining laws
that do not specifically include college and university faculty and other professionals
as protected employees will most likely be the focus of Yeshiva-like challenges. There
will be efforts in these states to incorporate provisions spelling out the unique characteristics of faculty as employees.
Kuechle, supra note 113, at 278-79.
130

'1-

Benson, supra note 56, at 286.
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protections of the Act. Declining enrollments, a fall-off in contributions to
American colleges and universities, accelerating voter resentment toward
public spending, and the glut of teachers on the market have combined to
impede an individual professional's ability to bargain successfully. Educators today are in fact subject to the evils the Act was designed to eradicate.
In a glutted job market, individual bargaining is a sham.. . . The Court's
refusal to consider the faculty's actual impotence to bargain individually
reveals a substantial disregard for the purpose of the Act.1""
While numerous additional ramifications of the Yeshiva decision could be
cited, these seven serve to demonstrate that the impact of Yeshiva is, and
will continue to be, substantial.
VI
Unquestionably, the full impact of the Court's ruling is not yet
known. In fact, it has been noted that the ruling may have some positive
effects. For example, "not having to engage in collective bargaining could
spell the difference between life and death for a few small colleges near
the brink of [financial] disaster. ' 1 3 5 As more universities remain in operation, there will be greater employment opportunities for teachers.136 Such
reasoning, however, reflects the human ability to discover the proverbial
silver lining in every cloud. Based on the considerations in section V, the
Yeshiva decision will prove to be quite devastating. Not only are faculty
bargaining rights called into question, but also there will be an enormous
expense in trying to overturn the decision. Furthermore, the ability of the
Board to make determinations based on their tasks as set forth in the Act
is placed in jeopardy. The effects of Yeshiva, then, are potentially longrange and negative. The following comment summarizes the scope of the
impact most clearly:
The Yeshiva decision threatens to end collective bargaining at private
colleges and universities. Since at most private colleges faculty members
serve some policymaking functions and exercise some advisory influence,
the broad application of the managerial exclusion will make it difficult for
faculty members to unionize. Thus, the managerial exclusion may emasculate the professional inclusion. If the Court seriously intends that anyone
who "formulates" or "effectuates" policy be considered a managerial employee, the implication is that the Act will be largely unavailable to professional employees, in the university and other contexts. The Court should
have adopted the analysis of the dissent."' 7

134

Casey, supra note 23, at 607.

" Maerhoff, supra note 68, at 16.
136 Id.

'37 The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 34, at 260-61.

